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Introduction
Systemic Risk (SR):
Property of systems of interconnected components:
Failure of a single entity (or small set of entities) can result in
a cascade of failures jeopardizing the whole system.
This happens in financial (i.e. interbank) systems:
⇒ Failure to manage systemic risk (SR) can be extremely
costly for society (e.g. financial crisis of 2007-2008)
Regulations proposed fail to address the fact that SR is a
network property (BASEL III. e.g. Tobin taxes, capital
requirements)
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Quantifying Systemic Risk
A financial network at time t is a pair (A¯t, ~Et)
A¯t: adjacency matrix of a weighted, directed network
~Et: vector of equities of institutions in the network
The systemic impact of bank i at time t:
SIi(A¯t, ~Et) =
∑
j 6=i
1{j fails | i fails}E
j
t .
→ Total value of financial system lost as a result of
bankruptcy of bank i
An algorithm can compute 1{j fails | i fails}
→ a` la DebtRank (Battiston et al. (2012), Thurner and
Poledna (2013))
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Quantifying Systemic Risk
Expected Systemic Loss:
ESL(A¯t, ~Et) =
n∑
j=1
P{j defaults} · SIj(A¯t, ~Et)
Different topologies have different effects on size of insolvency
cascades (e.g. Boss et al. (2004), Gai & Kapadia (2010),
Amini et al. (2013), Poledna et al. (2015))
Some work focuses on minimizing ESL(A¯t, ~Et), given a
certain topology (e.g. by injecting capital in a certain set of
banks)
Less work focuses on controlling the network topology (e.g.
Poledna & Thurner (2016))
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Matching Markets
Matching markets: Designed to resolve a range of complex
economic problems
Example 1: Students to Schools (Roth, 1984, 1999)
Example 2: Kidney donors to receivers (Roth et al., 2003)
Example 3: Online matching platforms (e.g. Airbnb, Uber)
→ We need an equilibrium concept based on stable matchings
(Gale & Shapley (1962))
Simple model of a credit system
At each discrete time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...bT c}, each bank i ∈ N
receives a liquidity shock it
it =

+1 with prob. y/2 (bank i in supply of liquidity)
−1 with prob. y/2 (bank i in demand of liquidity)
0 with prob. 1− y
where y ∈ [0, 1].
Induces a set of lenders and a set of borrowers:
Simple model of a credit system
At each discrete time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...bT c}, each bank i ∈ N
receives a liquidity shock it
it =

+1 with prob. y/2 (bank i in supply of liquidity)
−1 with prob. y/2 (bank i in demand of liquidity)
0 with prob. 1− y
where y ∈ [0, 1].
Induces a set of lenders and a set of borrowers:
Bilateral Contracts and Preference Lists
Simple bilateral contracts
Each borrower j has an exogenous failure probability ρj and a
reservation rate r¯j .
Each lenders has an exogenous baseline lending rate ri and
adds a (fair) risk premium hi(ρj):
rij = ri + hi(ρj)
Any borrower j prefers borrowing from lenders with lower
rates (up to a maximal rate)
If r1j < r2j < r3j < r¯j < r4j
→ Preference list P jβ = 1, 2, 3.
Risk premium makes lenders indifferent as to who they lend to
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We call the triplet (Lt,Bt,P) a market for liquidity at time t.
Two-sided matching
Let P = {P 5β , P 6β , P 7β , ...} be the set of all preference lists
We call the triplet (Lt,Bt,P) a market for liquidity at time t.
Outcome at each t, is a matching µt:
µt(1) = 7, µt(2) = 8, etc...
Equilibrium Concept: Stable Matching
Definition (Stable Matching)
A matching µ∗t is stable if :
(I) No set of borrowers ~b ∈ Bt could agree to swap their
counter-parties.
(II) The lending rates are below the borrowers’ reservation
rates (i.e. rij ≤ r¯j)
→ In words: No bank could benefit from behaving differently
Systemic Risk Created by a Stable Matching
Lemma (Equilibrium Multiplicity under Bilateral Contracting)
Any matching µt such that the lending rates are below the
borrowers’ reservation rates (i.e. rij < r¯j) is stable.
Many networks can emerge in equilibrium !
→ Results from borrowers having homogenous preferences
(the all prefer the lender i with lowest baseline rate ri)
How to compare the different equilibrium matchings?
→ Need a notion of efficiency.
Systemic Risk-Efficient Equilibrium
Definition (Systemic Risk-Efficient Equilibrium)
An equilibrium matching µ∗,efft is systemic risk-efficient if it
minimizes systemic risk given a certain transaction volume v:
µ∗,efft ∈ argmin
µ∗t :V ol(µ∗t )=ν
ESL(A¯∗t , ~Et).
Revisiting the toy example
Systemic Risk Efficient Equilibrium
Revisiting the toy example
Systemic Risk Inefficient Equilibrium
Transaction-Specific Tax
Question: Can we select a systemic risk-efficient matching that is
sustained as a unique equilibrium ?
Answer: Yes, by creating heterogeneous preferences by means of a
transaction-specific tax.
T = {τij}: a matrix of transaction-specific taxes, i ∈ Lt and
j ∈ Bt
τij ≥ 0 is a mark-up applied to the interest rate paid by bank
j when it borrows from bank i:
rTij = ri + hi(ρj) + τij
→ Idea introduced in Poledna & Thurner (2016)
Each borrower can now prefer a different lender
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Systemic Risk under SRT
T re-orders the preferences of each borrower over the set of
lenders
→ allows a regulator to create heterogeneous preferences, i.e.
each borrower j can now have a different preference list P jβ
with optimal match on top.
Proposition (Systemic Risk under Systemic Risk Tax)
For some desired volume ν, there exists T such that µ∗t is unique
and systemic risk efficient. We call this T a Systemic Risk Tax
(SRT).
SRT versus Tobin-like tax
A Tobin-like tax is a particular case of the SRT T
Borrowing rate under SRT T :
rTij = ri + hi(ρj) + τij
where τij = 0 for desired matches and τij > 0 for undesired
ones
Borrowing rate under Tobin-like tax:
rκij = ri + hi(ρj) + κ
where κ > 0 for all matches.
→ Makes all transactions more costly, without re-ordering the
borrowers’ preference lists.
→ Cannot select a particular systemic risk efficient equilibrium.
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SRT versus Tobin-like Tax
Proposition (Tobin-like tax versus Systemic Risk Tax)
There always exists T such that ESL(A¯∗,Tt , ~Et) ≤ ESL(A¯∗,κt , ~Et)
and V ol(µ∗,Tt ) ≥ V ol(µ∗,κt )
In words: SRT can achieve higher trading volume and lower
systemic risk
Regulator’s Optimization Problem
Solve this problem on a dynamically evolving complex network:
Banks receive liquidity shocks and trade that liquidity in the
form of interbank loans
At each t, regulator solve following one-period-ahead
optimization problem
Tˆ ∈ argmin
T :V ol(µ∗,Tt )=ν
ESL(A¯∗,Tt , ~Et)
→ Optimize matching of lenders and borrowers, given a
certain transaction volume
Regulator’s Optimization Problem
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